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Assessing generational differences in susceptibility to Social Engineering 
attacks. A comparison between Millennial and Baby Boomer 
generations. 
Abstract: 
In the age of digital society Social Engineering attacks are very successful and 
unfortunately users still cannot protect themselves against these threats. Social 
Engineering is a very complex problem, which makes it difficult to differentiate among 
vulnerable users. These attacks not only target young users or employees, they select 
massively, regardless of the users' age. Due to the rapid growth of technology and its 
misuse, everyone is affected by these attacks, everyone is vulnerable to them (Purkait, 
2012; Aggarwal et al., 2012). Users are considered the "weakest link" of security 
(Mohebzada et al., 2012; Mitnick and Simon, 2011) and as such, protecting confidential 
information should be the ultimate goal of all people. However, despite the fact that a 
number of different strategies exists to educate or train endusers to avoid these attacks, 
they still do, phishing still succeeds (Dhamija et al., 2006). This is mainly because the 
existing security awareness trainings, theoretical courses, or frameworks are expected to 
be equally effective for all users regardless of their age, but experience has shown that this 
is not true (Alseadoon, 2014). In order for these security trainings to be effective, it is 
essential that they are composed based on the Social Engineering security weaknesses 
attributed differently to different generations. Identifying unique characteristics 
(demographic and personality) of generations, determinants of their vulnerability is what 
this work aims to do. Then frameworks crafted based on that information (addressing 
these weaknesses) would be of use and worth implementing. Therefore, taking into 
consideration the complexity of this problem, this study suggests that there is a need to 
research it from a broader perspective, adding the "generation" element into the study 
focus to find out if there is indeed any difference in susceptibility among generational 
cohorts. In order to do so, this research will adapt both qualitative and quantitative 
methods towards reaching its objectives. Collected-data of users' performance in a 
phishing assessment are analyzed and psychological translation of results is provided. 
Thus, the first research question seeks to address what factors determinate endusers 
vulnerability to Social Engineering, and results from quantitative data (statistical analysis) 
show that generation is an important element to differentiate potential victims of Social 
Engineering, whilst computer-efficacy or educational level do not play any noteworthy 
role in predicting endusers' likelihood of falling for these threats. In consistency with the 
above elements and previous studies, also gender is shown no potentiality in predicting 
susceptibility (Parsons et al., 2013). The second research question deems to explain what 
makes generations differ in susceptibility and this study's findings propose that generation 
Y personality traits such as consciousness, extraversion and agreeableness are key 
influencers of their shown vulnerability. Finally, along with establishing strong 
foundations for future research in studying generations susceptibility to Social 
Engineering, this thesis employ these findings in proposing a framework aiming to lessen 
millennial likelihood to Social Engineering victimization. The originality of this study lies 
on its overall approach: starting with an exhaustive literature review towards identifying 
factors impacting generations' susceptibility level, then statistically measuring their 
vulnerability, to finish with a solution proposal crafted to suit the observed generational 
security weaknesses.  
Keywords: 
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Põlvkondade erisuste hindamine sotsiaalse manipuleerimisrünnetega 
(Social Engineering attacks). Y-põlvkonna (millennial) ja beebibuumi 
ajastul sündinud põlvkonna võrdlus. 
Lühikokkuvõte: 
Digitaalse ühiskonna ajastul on sotsiaalse manipuleerimise ründed (social engineering 
attacks)väga edukad ja kahjuks kasutajad ei suuda ennast selliste rünnakute vastu kaitsta. 
Sotsiaalne manipuleerimine (social engineering) on keeruline probleem, mistõttu on väga 
raske eristada kõige kaitsetumaid kasutajaid. Sellised ründed ei ole suunatud ainult noorte 
ja töötajate vastu, vaid on laiaulatuslikud sõltumata vanusest. Tehnoloogia kiire kasvu ja 
selle ebasihipärase kasutamise tõttu on kõik selliste rünnakute poolt mõjutatud, kõik on 
haavatavad (Purkait, 2012; Aggarwal et al., 2012). Kasutajaid peetakse turvalisuse 
"nõrgimaks lüliks" (Mohebzada et al., 2012; Mitnick and Simon, 2011), ja seega 
konfidentsiaalse info kaitsmine peaks olema kõikide inimeste eesmärk. Hoolimata sellest, 
et on olemas erinevaid lahendusi kasutajate koolitamiseks selliste rünnakute vältimiseks, 
andmepüük on jätkuvalt edukas (Dhamija et al., 2006). See on eelkõige seetõttu, et 
küberteadlikkuse koolitused, teoreetilised kursused või raamistikud eeldatakse olevat 
võrdselt efektiivsed kõikidele kasutajatele vaatamata nende vanusest, kuigi kogemus 
näitab et see ei ole tõsi (Alseadoon, 2014). Selleks, et koolitused saaksid olla efektiivsed, 
on oluline et need on koostatud lähtudes sotsiaalse manipuleerimise turvanõrkustest, mis 
on erinevatel vanusegruppidel erinevad. Käesoleva töö eesmärgiks on põlvkondade 
unikaalsete tunnuste (demograafilised ja isikulised) ja nende haavatavuste faktorite 
määratlemine. Sellealusel on loodud raamistik, mis on võimalik rakendada ja mis 
addresseerib neid nõrkusi. Arvesse võttes probleemi keerikust, käesolev uurimistöö näitab, 
et on vaja läbi viia edasisi uurimusi laiemast perspektiivist lähtuvalt lisades "põlvkondade" 
elemendi uurimiseesmärkidesse, et kas on erinevusi haavatuse riskide osas läbi 
põlvkondade. Käesolev uurimistöö kasutab nii kvalitatiivseid kui kvantitatiivseid 
meetodeid eesmärkide saavutamiseks. Andmekogumise rünnaku efektiivsuse hindamisel 
analüüsitakse kasutajate käitumist ning antakse sellele psühholoogiline tõlgendus. 
Esimene uurimisküsimus keskendub sotsiaalne manipulatsiooni haavatavuse faktorite 
määratlemisele ja kvantitatiivsed andmed (statistiline analüüs) näitab, et põlvkond on 
oluline element potentsiaalsete sotsiaalse manipulatsiooni ohvrite eristamisel, kusjuures 
arvutikasutusoskus ja haridustase ei määra olulist rolli hindamaks kasutajate tõenäosust 
langeda selliste rünnakute ohvriks. Eelpool toodud faktorite ja ka eelnevate uuringute 
alusel, ei ole ka sugu määrav faktor haavatuvuse ennustamisel (Parsons et al., 2013). Teine 
uurimisküsimus püüab selgitada, mis põhjustab põlvkondade haavatuvuse erinevused ning 
uuringu tulemusel näitavad, et  Y-põlvkonna isikuomadused, sh teadvus, ektravertsus, ja 
meeldivus on põhifaktorid mis mõjutavad haavatavust.  Viimasena, lisaks  tugeva aluse 
loomisel edaspidiseks põlvkondade haavatavuse uurimisel, pakub käesolev töö välja 
raamistiku, milles on eeltoodud leiud arvesse võetud ja mille eesmärk on vähendada Y-
põlvkonna haavatuse vähendamine sotsiaalse manipuleerimise rünnakutele.  Käesoleva 
magistritöö unikaalsus seisneb üldises lähenemisviisis: alates ulatusliku kirjanduse 
ülevaatega "põlvkondade" haavatavuse faktorite määratlemisega, statistilise analüüsiga 
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haavatavuste hindamiseks ja lõpetades lahenduse väljapakkumisega, mis aitab lahendada 
"põlvkondade" turvalisuse haavatavuse probleemi. 
Võtmesõnad: 
sotsiaalse manipuleerimise ründed, andmepüügi haavatavused, küberteadlikkus, 
põlvkondade kohort, y-põlvkond, beebibuumi ajastul sündinud põlvkond 
CERCS ERIALA:P170 Arvutiteadus, arvutusmeetodid, süsteemid, juhtimine 
(automaatjuhtimisteooria) 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
In the digital age, technology has an unavoidable presence in the lives of people, they can 
now carry all of their everyday activities online: go shopping online, work online, vote 
online, in other words, all users now have another "residency" online. While involved in 
such online services they often forget or pay little attention to the security threats behind 
these activities. Users do not give equal attention to security, some lack doing it and 
become “easy prey” or favorite targets for the attackers. Their lack of attention towards 
these attacks is known as vulnerability or susceptibility, which is attributed differently to 
victims. Some authors claim that the current generation (a precise definition of what a 
generation is, is given by (Borges et al., 2006)) is extremely vulnerable to these attacks, 
(Alseadoon, 2014) although other studies have found their parents (older users) possess 
higher susceptibility rates to Social Engineering attacks. Therefore, it is essential to 
specify groups more vulnerable to these attacks. 
In order to find out if there is any significant difference in the likelihood of falling victim 
to Social Engineering among generations, firstly it is necessary to identify factors which 
impact cohorts' vulnerability. Only then, it is possible to propose methods to reduce 
susceptibility of different groups to Social Engineering attacks, tailored specifically to 
their unique Social Engineering security weaknesses. 
There are many works addressing reasons why users fall for Social Engineering attacks. 
For instance, some studies list lack of technology related knowledge at the top, while some 
others argue users' education as the most important factor. Thus, to mitigate their 
susceptibility to Social Engineering attacks as undoubtedly the most successful security 
attacks nowadays, this study seeks to first identify and understand these determinant 
factors on deeper grounds and then address them to determine the most appropriate 
defense strategy. 
Social Engineering hereinafter SE, is considered to be "the act of manipulating a person to 
accomplish goals that may or may not be in the "target’s” best interest" (Hadnagy, 2010, 
p.32). From identity theft to financial losses, the damages that Social Engineering attacks 
bring both on individual and organizational scale are enormous. Phishing is the most 
commonly used form of Social Engineering attacks, there are around 150 million phishing 
emails sent every day stated in a study by Get Cyber Safe (2013).  
Taking into consideration the dimensions of this problem it has been studied by previous 
works as well, where most researches focused on specific personality or demographic 
factors determining certain individual’s susceptibility to Social Engineering attacks and 
leaving the generational element fairly unaddressed. Furthermore, the literature has been 
studying users' phishing detection behavior and no attention (to the best of this thesis’ 
knowledge) has been given to generations, in terms of comparison of their vulnerability to 
Social Engineering attacks. What if there is indeed difference?   
This thesis aims to properly address this question by assessing generations' real 
performance on Social Engineering attacks (particularly in phishing assessment). 
Moreover, a detailed focus to this problem is given in the following sections. 
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1.2 Research problem 
Users exposing important credentials to attackers, is one of the biggest issues of security 
of today and many researchers believe that vigilance and education are the only ways to 
protect against Social Engineering as such (Aggarwal et al., 2012; Kumaraguru et al., 
2007; Allen, 2006), since technology has demonstrated that it cannot do a lot in regards 
(Mitnick and Simon, 2011). However, no matter how much SE education frameworks 
are composed or how many SE security trainings are implemented, this problem has 
still remained unsolved, people still fall for SE attacks, they are still considered the 
easiest potential victims of the security chain (Purkait, 2012; Long, 2013). Therefore, 
the main reason why Social Engineering attacks are more successful than other security 
attacks, is because they target directly the human element since it is easier to manipulate 
people than technology (Mitnick, 2011). Mitnick and Simon explain that “cracking the 
human firewall is often easy, requires no investment beyond the cost of a phone call, and 
involves minimal risk” (2011, p. 4). In regards, previous works have lacked to cover all 
the reasons behind users' susceptibility, factors that influence their actual behavior when 
presented with actual Social Engineering attacks. Moreover, literature has a gap in 
identifying groups more vulnerable to Social Engineering attacks and understand each 
generation's SE security weaknesses.  
This work will seek to find and propose the most adequate way to educate this 
"vulnerability link" not to be the easiest pray of these attacks via patching their SE security 
weaknesses. 
For a proper approach towards the outlined problem, this thesis attempts to solve the 
following issues: 
• Firstly, it identifies factors impacting generational groups' victimization to SE 
attacks. 
• Then it assesses the differences in generational susceptibility via analyzing 
collected data from real-life performance on phishing assessment.  
• Translation of statistical analysis findings to personality differences across the two 
generational groups is the next carried out step. 
• Finally, it presents the most efficient SE security training program to fit the 
security requirements of specific generations.  
 
1.3 Research questions 
a. Is there any significant generational difference in susceptibility to Social 
Engineering attacks? 
This research claims to assess the response of this question by quantitatively examining 
data collected from real phishing attack assessment. Statistical analysis is used to reveal 
any potential distinction in vulnerability among generational groups, along with providing 
a clear panorama of their actual likelihood of victimization. Nowadays, many 
organizations complain of the current generation, or young people of today born between 
1982 and 2002 (Howe and Strauss, 2009), claiming that they are extremely vulnerable to 
SE threats (due to their distinct personality traits and heedless behavior) and that could put 
every organization into great security risks making organizations more and more unwilling 
to hire them. Is there indeed such a contrast in SE vulnerability among them or is it all 
overhyped? 
b. What factors impact generational groups susceptibility to SE?  
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Demographic factors are proven to indicate users tendency to respond to Social 
Engineering risks with many researchers suggesting women to be more susceptible than 
men (Janet et al., 2008) or others have found age group 18-25 more likely to become 
victims of these attacks. Besides age and gender, users scoring higher in computer-
efficacy are inclined to defend from phishing (Parrish et al., 2009). On the other side, also 
Big Five model's personality traits are claimed to be important factors to differentiate 
among groups, thus understanding their impact on generations' possibility to SE 
victimization is trivial. Literature has shown that different cohorts share unique 
characteristics and attitudes (Sessa et al., 2007; Wey Smola and Sutton, 2002), even 
talking about security. Thus, these qualities affect their actual behavior (Coomes and 
DeBard, 2004) and at the same time are key to explain users' tendency of becoming 
victims of phishing attacks (Parrish et al., 2009). This thesis will dig deeper into 
understanding each of these factors' correlation with vulnerability to SE threats, in terms 
of determining their role in predicting the more susceptible groups. For instance, would a 
phishing attack affect equally one teenager who shows an over-sharing attitude on SNS, 
and a Baby Boomer who does not share the same weakness? Does Social Engineering 
have the same success rate in groups scoring differently on agreeableness trait?  
c. How to craft the best solution to reduce cohorts vulnerability to Social Engineering 
threats?  
The final contribution of the author to complete this research as a whole, is to propose the 
most proper strategy to mitigate generational groups’ found susceptibility based on their 
specific SE security needs and requirements. After identifying the generational cohort 
most vulnerable to these risks and listing its SE unique security weaknesses, it is 
meaningful to explore the most appropriate defense meeting all the covered issues 
throughout this research. The solution is thought to be planned matching the necessary 
behavior skills to the targeted audience based on their SE needs and weaknesses. Thus, the 
thesis aims to design a solution based on the CIA triad principles via balancing both 
attackers' and targets' motivation (note that end users are not motivated to protect 
themselves from Social Engineering). The originality and the value of the solution is tied 
to its main objective: train the enduser through motivation.  
 
1.4 Significance of the study and contribution 
Considering it an essential starting point in deploying the most adequate solution to 
mitigate users vulnerability, this thesis proposes a new way to differentiate potential 
victims of Social Engineering attacks based on generational cohorts. 
This work strongly assumes that the existing frameworks fail to educate users against 
Social Engineering due to their generalized attribution or the wrong "tailoring" they give 
to all endusers, pretending equal effectiveness regardless of their security differences. 
Therefore, this thesis claims that via understanding and explaining how generational 
cohorts differ in perceiving Social Engineering risks (in terms of unique factors which 
make them fall for these attacks), it is easier to build up better mitigation methods or 
education frameworks to help lessen their susceptibility. 
Thus, the next contribution of the author is emphasizing the importance of crafting unique 
SE mitigation strategies for every generational cohort (and not only) attempting to patch 
specific security weaknesses each group owns. 
11 
 
Then, this thesis' effort in comparing different generational groups' actual vulnerability to 
social engineering attacks to find out if there is any noteworthy difference they share, is 
considered its main contribution.  
To achieve these goals, a great focus is given to identification of generations' factors 
influencing their likelihood to become potential victims. Hence, the first task is to identify 
and analyze different generations' specific personality attributes that play an important 
role in determining their degree of susceptibility with a systematic literature review 
performed. The second task is statistical analysis of the collected dataset from real 
phishing assessments. At the end as a full-packet, a defense strategy approaching findings 
is proposed. 
Briefly, the specific contribution is to: 
• explain the importance of measuring generational differences in vulnerability to 
Social Engineering attacks. 
• explore the best way to measure generations' actual susceptibility. 
• identify factors influencing cohort-groups' possibility to fall victims to SE attacks. 
• measure susceptibility via statistical analysis of the phishing collected-dataset. 
• explain found susceptibility difference across groups. 
• propose solutions to reduce the generational gap in vulnerability level. 
• propose future directions complying with this work's findings and implications. 
Moreover, the ability to identify groups more vulnerable to Social Engineering attacks 
should benefit the literature considerably in pursuing further research in mitigating these 
attacks and reducing the damages they bring. On the other side, this work can also be a big 
assistance to organizations as well since knowing your employees' weaknesses and 
vulnerability level is translated to risk assessment done to them. To this thesis best of 
knowledge no previous study has empirically examined the difference in susceptibility to 
Social Engineering attacks across these two specific generations. 
 
1.5 Thesis Outline 
The thesis is composed of 7 chapters.  
▪ Chapter 1- Introduction- This chapter introduces the general background, its 
motivation, the research focus and research questions.  
▪ Chapter 2- Definitions - This chapter explains further the core concepts of this 
thesis and gives an overview how the literature has defined them. 
▪ Chapter 3 - Related Work- It performs an exhaustive literature review via 
analyzing the different approaches taken by previous works on the same topic.  
▪ Chapter 4 - Methodology- It explains the theoretical framework and the research 
methodology used in this study.  
▪ Chapter 5 - Implementation - This chapter focuses on carrying out a statistical 
analysis of the phishing assessment dataset and results are presented.  
▪ Chapter 6 - Proposed Solution - It explains the found susceptibility differences 
among generations and outlines a solution proposal based on findings.  
▪ Chapter 7 - Conclusion - At the end, this chapter concludes the research via a 
detailed presentation of results and discusses implications for future research to 
address. 
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2 Defining Terms 
This chapter is mostly used to explain keywords crucial for this paper and discover how 
literature has defined them. Analyzing terms such as Social Engineering or security 
vulnerability in the context of this thesis is key before proceeding further. It also explains 
the core focuses of this thesis, the current generation (the millennial generation) and their 
parents (the Baby Boomer generation), seeking to gather more background knowledge on 
these subjects. Moreover, in this section abbreviations used throughout the thesis are 
explained.  
 
2.1 Acronyms and Abbreviations 
 
SE  Social Engineering 
NIST  National Institute of Standards and Technology 
BYOD  Bring your own device  
SNS  Social Networking Sites 
NDA  Non-disclosure Agreement 
CSE  Computer Self-Efficacy 
WWW  World Wide Web 
ENISA European Union Agency for Network and Information Security 
SAE  Security Awareness Education 
BB  Baby Boomer 
Gen Yer Generation Y member 
Gen Xer Generation X member 
TUT  Tallinn University of Technology 
2.2 Core Concepts   
Security awareness is one of the core terms of this work and a specific definition of it is 
essential in order to clarify possible misconceptions. Unfortunately, literature still lacks a 
precise definition of this term (Hänsch and Benenson, 2014) thus, researchers have come 
up with their own definitions implementing different approaches. Having said that, Hänsch 
and Benenson (2014) have carried out a deep systematic study in getting the definition of 
the term. They propose 3 different aspects of it to be defined: security awareness as 
perception, as protection and as behavior. Paying particular attention to all three 
categories, they emphasize the fact that users should know that danger exist and also how 
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to protect themselves against it. Similar to other papers, Shaw et al., differentiate between 
awareness programs and trainings (2009). They define security awareness as a 
combination of "perception, comprehension and projection" (2009, p.1). Amankwa et al., 
state that information security awareness is "any endeavor to focus employees' attention on 
information security in order to ensure that all employees understand their roles and 
responsibilities in protecting the information that is in their possession by using print or 
electronic media" (2014, p.3). However, there are other works that propose that security 
awareness aims to change behavior towards Social Engineering threats (Winkler and 
Manke, 2017). 
Actually, there is no "right" or "wrong" security awareness (Hänsch and Benenson, 2014), 
but in this paper Social Engineering awareness is defined as a combination of knowledge 
and attitude towards Social Engineering threats. To put it simply, it is the actual 
behavior users present towards real Social Engineering attacks. 
Social Engineering is the most crucial term to be defined as the main focus of this thesis. 
It is interesting to know that even users that almost do not have any relation to technology 
at all understand that Social Engineering is a problem and as such, it should be solved. A 
simple search on Wikipedia precisely highlights it being "psychological manipulation of 
people into performing actions or divulging confidential information". One of the creators 
of the http://www.social-engineer.org, Hadnagy deeply explains all the consecutive phases 
of Social Engineering attacks and the idea of persuasion behinds it (2010). Furthermore, 
Allsopp states that Social Engineering is "obtaining of confidential or privileged 
information by manipulating legitimate sources" (2010, p.51). Regarding the way how 
Social Engineering attacks are carried out, the traditional template is described in detail by 
Snyder (2015), explaining all phases from information gathering to persuasion. 
There is an enormous number of definitions for Social Engineering, but the one to best fit 
this paper's perspective is "the act of manipulating a person to accomplish goals that 
may or may not be in the "target's" best interest" (Hadnagy, 2010, p.32). 
In light of this thesis' aim, phishing is the next term that should be aptly defined. Actually, 
there are many disagreements among authors while categorizing phishing, as many of 
them do not consider it a form of Social Engineering attack (Snyder, 2015). However, 
definitions given to this term are very similar, even by quoting Wikipedia: "phishing is the 
attempt to obtain sensitive information such as usernames, passwords, and credit card 
details (and, indirectly, money), often for malicious reasons, by disguising as a trustworthy 
entity in electronic communication"(Wikipedia, 2017) one can get the idea behind it. In 
the context of this thesis it is described as: a method used by cybercriminals to steal 
mostly login-credentials or other relevant information by camouflaging emails to 
look legal for mainly financial fraud or identity theft (Alghamdi, 2017). Phishing 
attacks mostly deploy tricking techniques (sophisticating day by day) and different 
mediums (mainly emails or social networking sites) to make users give up personal 
information. Phishing attacks are not solely damaging end users by making them phish out 
log-in information or install malware on their computers (Hong, 2012), but can also ruin 
an organizations' reputation together with tremendous monetary losses. As far as users 
lack the proper security behavior in regards, phishing will continue being a step ahead of 
the current attempts to protect endusers against it.  
Susceptibility to Social Engineering attacks is the likelihood that a person will respond 
to and become victim of a real Social Engineering attack. Others have also proposed 
similar definitions, defining it as "the inability of users to suspect a phishing email" 
(Alseadoon, 2014, p.67). A different aspect is defined by Parrish et al., though, in context 
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of phishing it is the time to respond to such attack or the time calculated that a person will 
interact with the attacker (the hook) (2009). It is the state of being inclined to respond to 
a SE attack. 
Millennials are actually called people of the current generation or the first generation of 
the new millennium. Born and raised in the times of digital technology and social media, 
they are the first "always connected" generation (Palfrey and Gasser, 2011; Prensy, 2001). 
Many different categorizations exist regarding this generation's starting period, but in this 
study's scope it is from or after 1982 to the early 2000s (Howe and Strauss, 2009). 
Actually, there are also different points of view regarding this generation's endpoint, as 
there are researches that argue that millennials are still being born (Donnison, 2007). 
However, it is noticed that most of the studies use the span of 18-25 years to categorize 
them. Literature has called them by different nicknames: the Net Generation (Braber, 
2016; Becker, 2015), digital natives (Stringfellow Otey, 2013; Palfrey and Gasser, 2011), 
Generation Y (Hurst and Good, 2009), Nexters (Ng et al., 2010) or Nexus Generation. All 
these labels are coined due to them being highly technology or internet-competent and the 
fact that they have a strong multitasking and BOYD attitude in their workplace. It is 
claimed they trust the virtual world like no previous generation, and moreover lack 
attention of their working organization's cyber security policies. It is also argued that users 
of age 18-25 are more susceptible to phishing attacks than older age-groups (Pattinson et 
al., 2012; Sheng et al., 2010). On the other hand, many researchers claim that this 
generation's members are more aware of phishing attacks due to being computer-savvy 
users. A detailed overview of the Millennial generation's unique qualities related to SE 
security awareness compared to the particular traits of the previous generation is presented 
in the following chapter. 
On the other side are the Baby Bommers, the other studied subject of this thesis. People 
of this generation are born between 1946-1964 (Kumar and Lim, 2008). According to 
Borges et al., they have higher self-reliance than millennials (2006). Current literature has 
called them immigrants of the digital world (Jiang et al., 2016). In comparison to digital 
natives (current generation members) who have grown up with computers and the Internet, 
they "learned how to use email and social engineering late in life" (Palfrey and Gasser, 
2011, p.4). Millennial, Baby Boomer, digital natives and digital immigrants or other alike 
terms are used interchangeably throughout this study.  
 
2.3 Studied Subjects 
As stated in the introduction as well, this study extends its concentration on two particular 
generational groups: Millennials and Baby Boomers. Actually, selecting solely these two 
generations to focus on, is not purposeless. The main motivation behind this choice, is due 
to the conflicting notions: digital natives v. digital immigrants. Comparing one cohort that 
has grown up with the internet being always there with a cohort group which learned to 
use the internet later on life (Palfrey and Gasser, 2011) and understanding this difference 
in respect to falling for Social Engineering attacks is trivial.   
Secondly, this thesis is focused only on these two specific groups as they cover most of the 
today's workforce. Moreover, in the nearest future the boomers will retire and millennials 
will take over the workforce by making up the biggest percentage in the workforce (80% 
by end of 2020). Thus, it is a must to find out their susceptibility in comparison to the 
previous generations in the workforce, then organizations will know what to expect and 
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what to consider while crafting security policies. Here it is also safe to mention the 
organizations' recent unwillingness to hire employees of Generation Y due to the claims 
that they are much more likely to fall for these attacks. To aid the understanding of 
organizations' reluctance, it is crucial to seek out the real truth, their degree of 
vulnerability to falling for Social Engineering attacks.  
Then, having experienced different historical events, they do not differ only on age, but 
also on personality which has relevant ramifications on their Social Engineering attitude 
and behavior. For instance, their SE security perception: the millennial generation consider 
themselves more protective to these threats compared to boomers and vice versa. It is 
relevant to study their perceptions towards these attacks in general and to identify their 
actual degree of susceptibility. Furthermore, sharing a strong relationship among them 
(parent-child) and having lived in two different societies (millennials are the internet kids), 
it is interesting to find out their SE security weaknesses.  
On the other side, there exist many inconsistencies in generations starting dates (Solnet et 
al., 2012) (many researchers conflict on categorizing cohorts years span). Risking to lead 
to a possible generational overlap because of this reason, this study left out of its focus the 
generation in between the Baby Boomer and the Millennial generations (Generation X). 
As such, this research assumes a more precise differentiation among the targeted cohorts 
in regards to their vulnerability to Social Engineering.  
Finally, the previous literature has claimed that specifically these two cohorts differ the 
most in terms of security awareness, it is time to solve this dilemma, do they indeed? 
 
2.4 Summary 
This chapter has identified and explained the main concepts of this work, defining them in 
the context of the studied problem. It discusses the central subjects of this thesis: the 
Boomers and Millennials and specifies the reasons why does it matter to direct the 
research on these particular generations. Furthermore, the list of abbreviations used 
throughout the thesis is provided here. 
 
 
16 
 
3 Related Work 
In this chapter an exhaustive research on the current literature is carried out to help 
identify the relevant papers conducted on this topic, to help explain the academic context 
pursued towards writing this thesis. The way it approaches the previous research is via a 
systematic and exhaustive literature review, considering the research questions to be 
answered (Armitage and Keeble-Allen, 2008). Hence, many online libraries and other 
repositories are used as sources to gather previous related works. In order to find studies 
pertinent to this thesis focus, a combination of keywords such as : social engineering, 
phishing, vulnerability, susceptibility, millennial and generational cohort is used for the 
searching phase. Papers are then gathered for a brief abstract reading, to select the ones 
noteworthy for this thesis. As a matter of fact, this chapter identifies and digests factors 
proposed by current literature determining users' degree of vulnerability to analyze them 
later in the next chapter. It seeks to find out to which group the literature has coined the 
term "easy prey of SE attacks", to digital natives or to their parents? Apart from that, it 
seeks to understand reasons why standard trainings or awareness increasing materials have 
limited effect in reducing users' vulnerability.   
 
3.1 Identifying factors impacting users' vulnerability 
To defend from Social Engineering attacks organizations assign a considerable budget to 
protective measures such as technology or employees security trainings. However, due to 
different reasons they fail to properly protect their assets from these types of attacks. Thus, 
many researchers have addressed the problem of Social Engineering as an area of 
particular concern in terms of finding out what makes its attacks so successful. 
One of the most explicit approaches to this question is taken by Dhamija et al., trying to 
understand why phishing works (2006). The answer to this question seems easy though: 
security is not the main concern of people (Purkait, 2012). Most of the researchers 
somehow ring the alarms, stressing that "Users are not motivated to learn about security; 
for most users, security is a secondary task" (Kumaraguru et al., 2010, p.1). Although, this 
is not that superficial since there are many other reasons behind this heedlessness, 
weaknesses that social engineers wisely exploit. What particular factors predict users' 
vulnerability to SE attacks?  
Lack of knowledge related to Social Engineering in particular or technology in general is 
said to be one key factor influencing users' susceptibility. Literature uses the term 
computer self-efficacy (CSE) meaning in other words, the users' capability to successfully 
use computers (Compeau and Higgins, 1995). Dhamija et al., in their work explain that 
people lack the adequate knowledge to understand how operating systems, email or the 
entire web works and, phishing criminals exploit this weakness to get what they need. 
Furthermore, many endusers ignore security warnings because they find them technically 
difficult to understand (2006; Wu et al., 2006), and they risk more falling for phishing 
attacks. Along these lines, Downs et al., suggest a more detailed understanding of the web 
as such, could reduce vulnerability (2007). Therefore, technology sophistication decreases 
individuals' phishing susceptibility (Wright and Marett, 2010) since users' showing high 
computer knowledge tend to doubt more the authenticity of everything online (Wright et 
al., 2010).  
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However, deficiency in knowledge regarding technology is not the only factor influencing 
users' likelihood to become potential victims of SE attacks, their lack of awareness is 
another vital element (Aburrous et al., 2010; Wright and Marett, 2010). With Social 
Engineering attacks evolving day-by-day, users should be aware how to protect against 
and not simply know that they exist. The wrong decisions people usually make when faced 
with real phishing attacks are mainly due to their lack of awareness, demonstrating once 
more the great necessity of efficient phishing awareness trainings to deploy (Aburrous et 
al., 2010). Although, a contrary approach is assessed by Halevi et al., who disagree to 
translate users' susceptibility to lack of awareness (2015) since experience have shown that 
regardless possessing phishing awareness, many users yet fall for phishing attacks in great 
terms (Alseadoon, 2014). 
"Big Five" personality model, made up of traits such as openness, conscientiousness, 
extraversion, agreeableness and neuroticism (Gosling et al., 2003) are found to be notable 
predictors of human behavior (Jagatic et al., 2007), and potential determinants of 
individuals' vulnerability to Social Engineering attacks (Uebelacker and Quiel, 2014; 
Halevi et al., 2013). Addressing the relation of personality and phishing email response, 
many studies have proposed neuroticism the trait mostly associated with responding to 
phishing emails (Halevi et al., 2013; Cho et al., 2016). Furthermore, Cho et al., on their 
study developed a mathematical model aimed to predict what personality elements are 
indicators of social engineering vulnerability and found that agreeableness and 
neuroticism have remarkable effects on decision performance (2016). However, in another 
work Halevi et al., via real-life spear-phishing attacks conducted in their study targeted 
conscientiousness the most relevant trait to determine phishing susceptibility (2015). On 
the other side, Parrish et al., suggest that extraversion in context of phishing could lead to 
increased vulnerability (2009). Supporting the same findings, Workman explains that 
extraversion is considerably related to high effective commitment, making users divulge 
personal information as they want to fit to some particular group (2008). Moreover, 
people's ability to detect deception is directly influenced by their emotions (Forgas et al., 
2008) and characterized by positive emotions, extraverted people may easily fall for 
phishing while processing emails (Alseadoon et al., 2012). Parrish et al., in their work 
were focused mainly on trust as one of the main aspect of agreeableness and found it to be 
the strongest personality characteristic influencing peoples' susceptibility (2009; Modic 
and Lea, 2012). While users' phish out sensitive information, trust is highly involved 
(Weirich and Sasse, 2001).  
It is known that Social Engineering attacks become even more successful when criminals 
are armed with enough information about targets beforehand, and social networks are the 
perfect repositories to provide such information. SNSs are recently converted into 
dangerous weapons in the hands of social engineers who may take criminal actions 
towards damaging endusers. In the same line with these studies Vishwanath et al., in their 
work implemented a research model to explain factors that best predict an individual's 
possibility to get phished, and apart from technological efficacy and email load, suggest 
also media habits as a major contributor to Social Engineering susceptibility (2011). With 
internet being no longer limited to anyone, people often just want to explore the online 
world but unfortunately happen to expose themselves to phishing (Furnell, 2010), mainly 
due to the over-sharing attitude on social media. Defining self-disclosure as personal-
relevant information exchanged online in this paper's context, it is said to be a very 
dangerous asset in help of so-called social phishing attacks (Jagatic et al., 2007). As a 
matter of fact, Halevi et al., did the first work on studying the relationship among 
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personality, Facebook and phishing and found that people who tend to post more on 
Facebook are more vulnerable to privacy attacks (2013). 
 
At the end, Mitnick and Simon quote: “as improvements are made in the technological 
weapons against security breaches, the social engineering approach… will certainly 
become significantly more frequent and attractive to information thieves” (2011, p. 259). 
It has passed a long time since then but unfortunately this statement is more accurate than 
never, Social Engineering attacks continue making the latest news and feasibly increase in 
the nearest future. This all means that there is still an enormous and rapid work that should 
be done in order to further study these and other factors influencing users' likelihood to 
become prey of Social Engineering attacks. In order to hopefully "patch" them in the 
nearest future it should further the investigations aiming to understand the human aspect of 
these semantic attacks. At the end of the day, this is not a problem with no solution, it is 
just a very complex issue. As Schneier quotes: "to target the people problem, not the math 
problem" (2000), these elements should be addressed and studied in deeper grounds and 
dimensions. 
 
3.2 Millennials vs. Baby Boomers,  who are more vulnerable? 
Many researchers (Kumaraguru et al., 2009; Sheng et al., 2010; Workman, 2008; Dhamija 
et al., 2006; Alseadoon, 2014) agree that demographics explicitly impacts users' 
perceptions and decisions when dealing with phishing emails. Specifying solely "age" 
asset of demographics, they claim that it can anticipate users' likelihood to become 
potential victims. There are other works though, that found that user's demographic in 
general and age in particular, cannot predict users' vulnerability to phishing attacks 
(Mohebzada et al., 2012; Long, 2013). Considering these contradictions, it is safe to 
clarify that different works carry out different approaches to the division of age periods 
when categorizing groups and thus, may obtain distinct findings (Alseadoon, 2014).  
Emphasizing the lack of research studying demographics in context of phishing 
susceptibility Sheng et al., argue that via knowing groups more susceptible to phishing, it 
is easier to concentrate into anti-phishing education (2010). This work is the nearest to this 
thesis's focus, not only in terms of analyzing groups more vulnerable to phishing attacks, 
but also in studying the psychology behind their great potential to fall for such threats. 
Moreover, they found that targets of age 18-25 fell mostly for the attack (Sheng et al., 
2010).  
Being born on the glorious times of Web 2.0, the members of net generation are used to 
the tremendous amount of information online, as a result they can handle and process it 
better than any other generation (Parment, 2013). Moreover, it is undoubting that people 
of current generation are great multi-taskers and tech-savvy and also, it is suggested that 
these qualities can decrease the possibility of getting phished or social engineered. 
However, even-though the millennial group possess these unique characteristics in high 
rates, they still fall for phishing, mainly because they overestimate themselves to be able 
to evaluate certain cues in phishing emails (Stebila, 2010). This implies that they consider 
themselves enough computer-efficient to defend against these threats but actually, they are 
equally likely to get phished as others less technically sophisticated. Alseadoon also, in his 
PhD dissertation found that young people aged 18-25 are more vulnerable to these attacks 
as they tend to be more risk-takers (2014). To support the same findings, other authors 
explain that young people of today yet lack the sufficient security awareness to protect 
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themselves from internet vulnerabilities (Boyd, 2007; Livingstone et al., 2005). The 
National Study of Youth and Religion, stated that almost 60% of millennials believe in 
their own greatness to be able to distinguish what is right or wrong in terms of security 
(Stein, 2013), overestimating the ability to protect themselves online compared to older 
users (Miltgen and Peyrat-Guillard, 2014; Jiang et al., 2016). This generation's members 
have narcissistic perceptions (Bergman et al., 2010) and entitlement attitude (Ng et al., 
2010; Bauer, 2009) due to the excessive praise gained by their parents, the Boomers. Other 
noteworthy studies attain their focus on agreeableness and stated that more agreeable 
individuals are at a higher rate of security risk and generally, younger people and women 
present higher values of agreeableness (Darwish et al., 2012). 
On the other hand, contrasting the above findings there are studies that have found that 
older adults lack awareness and knowledge concerning security more compared to 
younger users (Jiang et al., 2016). Therefore, in their work Jiang et al., analyze differences 
in SE behavior among 3 generations: the Silent Generation, older Baby Boomers and 
Millennials. Hence, an interesting fact noticed on their findings is the SE security 
perceptions the groups have for each-other, such that older adults defined Millennials 
reckless and more vulnerable to online threats, while Millennials claimed to attribute this 
weakness to older adults, considering themselves knowledgeable enough not to fall for 
these threats (Jiang et al., 2016). In context of media over-sharing habits previous studies 
have showed previous generations' members less likely to post personal information on 
Facebook compared to digital natives (Christofides et al., 2012) decreasing their scale of 
vulnerability.  
Actually, there exist different approaches taken by researchers to find out user age-groups 
more likely to become potential victims of Social Engineering attacks and as a result, 
different findings are presented. Although, the findings are not proportional due to distinct 
directions purchased and differences in groups' age division. Accordingly, this explains the 
fact that there is no previous work (to the best of this thesis knowledge) that focuses on 
studying generational-groups differences in likelihood to fall for SE attacks.   
 
3.3 Methods implemented to measure users' vulnerability 
Proportional with users' increase in vulnerability to Social Engineering attacks, have been 
the proposed attempts to lessen it. Experience has shown that it cannot be reduced what is 
not calculated, as such the approach should start from measuring end-users' vulnerability 
to later be able to try to mitigate it. There are different methodologies proposed to measure 
users' susceptibility to phishing or Social Engineering attacks in general, researchers have 
suggested many possible ways starting from the real attack scenario assessments to 
cognitive processing tests. Therefore, Kumaraguru et al. proposed the Cognitive 
Reflection Test(CRT), as an efficient way to measure users' vulnerability to phishing. 
They found that people who scored high on the CRT were more likely to fall for phishing 
emails (2007; Jensen,1998).  
On the other side, Kevin Mitnick suggests security assessment as the best way to test 
employees' susceptibility to Social Engineering attacks (Mitnick and Simon, 2009). 
Sharing the same proposal, Jakobsson et al., argue that real-life attack assessments not 
only explain potential extend of victimization but at the same time identify the kind of 
attacks working the most among end users (2008). Shifting the attention to organizations, 
Nohlberg also stresses that the best way to measure employees' security awareness is 
testing them when they do now know they are being tested (2005). However, researchers 
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emphasize the fact that those assessments should be ethically and legally complying with 
security policies (Jakobsson and Ratkiewicz, 2006). Moreover, SANS Institute also 
proposes security awareness survey as the adequate method to measure employees' 
awareness within an organization (also the best way to identify gaps in regards to security 
awareness) (SANS Institute, 2017). 
Each of these methods have drawbacks, some arise in more accurate results and some lack 
it, some involve ethical issues or risks of data disclosure. For instance, it is claimed that 
some methods produce less reliable data and others, can easily put subjects at risk through 
exposure of sensitive data (Hale et al., 2015). Aiming to reduce endusers vulnerability, 
many researchers propose education and training to prevent people from falling for this 
attacks (Jakobsson and Myers, 2006; Downl et al., 2006). Taking into consideration the 
failure on teaching the individual not to fall for Social Engineering attacks, is seems like 
"security user education is a myth" (Gorgling, 2006). 
 
3.4 Gaps in literature 
As the problem of social engineering is escalating and techniques deployed by attackers 
sophisticating, it is vital to investigate further this issue of great concern in deeper 
grounds, to possibly find out why educational programs and standard awareness trainings 
have not lessen endusers fallings for phishing (even-though they have been trained) 
(Karakasiliotis et al., 2006; Kumaraguru et al., 2009). In order to compose frameworks or 
tools aiming to reduce phishing susceptibility one must firstly understand how and why 
people fall for them (Downs et al., 2007). To do this, the literature yet lacks to further 
consider potential roles of individual attributes into predicting their vulnerability.  
Secondly, there should be a fair balance in studying victims' SE detection and response 
behavior, in terms of difference in their susceptibility determination. Apart from that, 
almost all the existing work is focused on the individual to understand why he falls for 
these attacks, and little attention is given to other elements of study for instance, 
generational cohorts. In regards this work will purpose a new direction to pursue, claiming 
a meaningful correlation among generations and vulnerability to Social Engineering.  
Should it ever be considered that in lieu of composing more and more standard solutions 
that lack to fully achieve their goals, to address potential victims differently, perhaps into 
particular generational-groups. What if trying to tailor mitigation strategies to different 
audiences (generational groups) respectively in line of their needs and weaknesses in 
terms of vulnerability to SE attacks? Would this change anything? 
 
3.5 Summary 
This chapter has analyzed previous approaches taken to identify the main factors 
explaining users' likelihood of falling for Social Engineering attacks and at the same time 
have examined the proposed methods deemed to measure users' scale of vulnerability. All 
this done in purpose to possibly understand the extent of the gap in the literature and what 
is lacking in terms of directions to pursue in the future to properly address these issues. To 
finally find out who are more susceptible and what qualities makes them behave that way, 
to later be able to close this gap. 
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4 Conceptual Framework 
This chapter presents the theoretical framework of the thesis and gives further insight to 
the importance of the research problem studied in this paper. Hereby, it explains the 
research methodology of data collection. The main research question and the reflective 
hypothesis are synthesized here. The factors identified by the previous studies are 
categorized and will be analyzed and digested to justify findings.  
 
4.1 Research question and hypothesis 
➢ RQ : Are generational cohorts equally vulnerable to Social Engineering attacks? 
 
In order to deepen the focus on millennial generation, in this chapter the research question 
is slightly modulated to be: Is there any significant difference in susceptibility to Social 
Engineering attacks among the current generation and their parents' generation? To assess 
the response of this question, a holistic approach is taken combining an exhaustive 
literature review with analysis of quantitative data obtained from real-life phishing 
experiment conducted. 
 
➢ H1: There is a notable difference in susceptibility to Social Engineering attacks 
among generation Y and Baby Boomers. 
 
This study hypothesizes that indeed there is distinction in susceptibility among 
generational cohorts, specifically millennials may be more vulnerable and possess a 
greater likelihood of becoming potential victims of SE. To shed light to this problem of 
particular concern, this study will combine generations security weakness indicators  
supported by analysis of their real performance in phishing assessment. To reveal insights 
into how differently generations get Social Engineered, throughout this study generations 
are studied as groups rather than individuals, assuming them representatives of each whole 
generation (Fisher, 2015). 
 
4.2 Obtained dataset justification 
When trying to carry out a Social Engineering attack experiment or a phishing assessment 
in particular, there are a lot of constraints involved, be them ethical, legal, security or 
privacy related. Keeping in mind these considerations discussed below and the opportunity 
to get a proper dataset of sufficient quality for this study's research questions, the author 
does not conduct its own experiment and in lieu of, decides to use dataset from previously 
conducted phishing assessment.  
4.2.1 Ethical Considerations 
Even-though phishing experiments are considered one of the best ways to measure users' 
and employees' vulnerability to Social Engineering threats, there are also cases in which 
organizations avoid conducting them. Major contributors to this reluctance are ethical 
issues evolved. Social Engineering is strongly correlated with ethical considerations due to 
manipulation and deception techniques used. Moreover, these concerns are more present 
when running real-life phishing assessments since they have direct impact on participants. 
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Thus, they can damage them financially but most frightening is the psychological cost 
they leave to victims (Alseadoon, 2014; Aburrus et al., 2010). Experience has shown that 
most of the participants react really harsh to the assessment since they feel violated, 
mainly when they are not previously notified about the attack (Kumaraguru et al., 2009). 
"Some of the employees called the experiment unethical, inappropriate, illegal and 
unprofessional"(Aburrus et al., 2010, pg.251). The cases requiring researchers to be 
prosecuted are numerous, for instance in cases when participants' personal information 
from social-media is used.  
Having a good dataset on hand (with respect to this thesis research questions), this work 
does not consider it necessary repeating the same study. However, before obtaining the 
dataset this study ensured that the sample group was not asked to provide any secret 
account information and also ensured to destroy the raw data at the end of this study. 
Anyway, to further the understanding of  how to conduct ethical SE assessments, it is 
important to read the Jakobsson and Finn (2007) work, emphasizing three ethical 
principles to take into account: the respect for persons, beneficence, and justice, in terms 
of rights and the well-being of users (Jakobsson and Finn, 2007). 
 
4.2.2 Legal Considerations 
Apart from ethical constraints, while conducting an experiment researchers often have to 
assess legal considerations as well. There have been cases unintentionally resulted  in law 
infringements and consequently, many researchers were being sued or prosecuted. Hence, 
everyone should be especially careful with risks of data breaches, data leakages or identity 
thefts. Unintentional leads to sensitive personal data harvesting or confidential information 
disclosure can occur, be this on individual or organizational scale. Data protection laws 
and regulations, protecting actors' privacy or security rights on internet should be strongly 
taken into account. On the other hand, companies' Terms and Conditions should be strictly 
respected and followed in cases where organizations are subjects of the experiment. 
Taking into account all these risks and having the opportunity to rely on others' data, this 
study avoids carrying out such risky experiments. 
 
4.2.3 Getting Approvals 
Besides ethical and legal considerations, getting the needed approvals on time is another 
serious element many authors have to ensure before conducting such studies. Hereby, one 
needs to get the appropriate approvals from the entities evolved in the assessment before 
setting-up such assessment. For instance, in this case it was aimed to conduct the 
experiment in a big organization and in a high school thus, getting the needed approvals 
would had not been an easy task, taking into account the fact that young teenagers and 
Baby Boomer employees would have been the experiments' feasible targets. On one side 
stand companies, which work for years to ensure employees' trust and on the other side 
stand the school's representatives or teenagers' parents who would not have been easily 
convinced to expose students to risks of this nature. Adding here the fact that getting the 
right approvals takes a lot of time, this study considered it be the case.  
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4.2.4 Significant sampling 
Along these lines, the most important factor that should be taken into account while 
planning to conduct an experiment is the sampling. Getting a considerable sample to carry 
out the phishing attack is often difficult due to many limitations, and this leads to fail 
attaining statistically meaningful sample size and results as well. In this case, obtaining a 
truly representative sample of target users was difficult, nearly impossible. Apart from 
that, ensuring a homogeneous representative of the studied generations from the available 
dataset, is the main reason why this study does not involve conducting any form of Social 
Engineering attack assessment. 
 
4.3 Methodology used 
In this research a combination of data-collection techniques is used, a mix of quantitative 
and qualitative methods. Taking into account this research problem of particular concern, 
the methodology chosen aims to solve out the research questions (Gable, 1994). By 
combining these two complimenting methods, it is studied the interactive relationship 
between groups' security weaknesses and their actual susceptibility, to provide detailed 
insights into how and why generations get Social Engineered.  
 
4.3.1 Qualitative method 
In the first phase, the literature review is conducted to identify factors impacting users' 
possibility to fall for SE attacks, making up the qualitative data used in this study. The 
theoretical model carried out aims to investigate and digest the level of influence these 
factors have on groups' susceptibility. Their impact is tested and evaluated combining 
related works' findings with phishing email experiment's results. This work was reluctant 
in choosing other methods for the data collection (survey or questionnaire) due to high 
chances of outcomes overestimation, since users still limit the understanding of phishing 
(Jakobsson and Finn, 2007). As such, this research methodology assumes that each factor 
extracted from the literature review plays an important role in explaining users' 
vulnerability to Social Engineering attacks. The approach assessed does not assign every 
factor to a single generation, in a one-to-one relationship (Fisher, 2015) rather distributes 
them on each generation, based on their degree of appliance and level of presence. The 
generation showing higher occurrence of elements strongly related to victimization, is 
determined the most likely to fall for Social Engineering attacks, and hence, the most 
vulnerable. The detailed analysis is carried out in the next chapter. This thesis validates 
findings and assumptions analyzing the obtained dataset. 
 
4.3.2 Quantitative method 
Quantitative methodology is proven to be able to support findings, that is the main reason 
this study preferred to integrate it in the chosen methodology. On the other side, both 
literature and experience has shown that one of the best methods to gather data related to 
participants' behavior and their potential to fall for these attacks is via real-life phishing 
assessments. In distinct from other forms of attacks, phishing experiments have the benefit 
of being able to measure real performance results. In this way, the gathered data from the 
experiment provide a panoramic view of users' deployed decisions when faced with real-
life phishing emails and hence, their degree of vulnerability.  
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The quantitative dataset taken from a phishing assessment is analyzed using appropriate 
tools, and details are given in the next chapter.  
 
4.3.3 Experimental variables 
• Dependent variables:  
o Susceptibility 
• Independent variables:  
o  Computer self-efficiency,  
o  Generation, 
o  Personality traits, 
o  Education, 
o  Gender,  
o Age 
 
The identified qualities assumed to be primary indicators of groups' degree of 
vulnerability, make up the independent variables of the thesis statistical analysis. To better 
comprehend the relationship between independent variables with the dependent one, a 
detailed statistical analysis is carried out and findings are presented in the next chapter. 
Studied by previous works as well, all these elements are thought to play a significant 
impact on determining peoples' susceptibility and this study will seek to quantitatively 
validate assumptions in the next chapter.  
 
4.4 Summary 
This chapter has presented an overview of the research methodology, what approach is 
used in the thesis and how it is implemented. The justifications of obtained dataset is 
provided and hypothesis is stated. Hence, it has also revealed techniques used towards 
collection of both qualitative and quantitative data for analysis. The ethical and legal 
considerations are presented. Therefore, the evaluation framework that lays out the 
research questions is done on the next chapter.   
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5 Quantitative Analysis 
This chapter describes the implementation of the conceptual framework presented in the 
previous chapter and its empirical evaluation. It also analyzes phishing assessment 
obtained dataset and report findings. Here are also outlined factors influencing phishing 
susceptibility dissimilarity among generations. The groups' found differences in the degree 
of vulnerability are explained using generations' unique characteristics synthesized from 
the literature review. 
 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
In order to answer the main research question listed on chapter 1(Is there any significant 
generational difference in susceptibility to Social Engineering attacks?), the simulated 
phishing assessment dataset is analyzed. Despite its many constraints (mainly legal and 
ethical), phishing experiment is considered the best method to measure users' vulnerability 
since it can demonstrate users' actual likelihood of victimization (Jones, 2016). Along with 
assessing endusers' susceptibility, it can outline relevance to real world behavior users 
show when faced with any SE attacks. 
 
5.1.1 Experimental Email 
Simulated phishing experiment is used to measure users' actual susceptibility to SE 
attacks, as the most genuine way to assess their actual phishing management behavior. 
Adding particular value to this research, the collected-dataset is received from another 
researcher (Swapan Purkait). The type of phishing email sent to participants is a click 
email, aiming to direct participants to disclose sensitive information (specifically, their 
Gmail account login credentials) into a spoofed site. 
Regarding the determination when one becomes victim of phishing, according to different 
studies and authors there are many definitions of "falling for the phish". Thus, a precise 
explanation of its meaning, is given by Sheng et al., (2010) however, in this thesis context 
falling for phish or getting social engineered, are considered cases when participants 
clicked on the provided link and submitted their personal information.  
 
5.1.2 Experimental Subjects 
A total of 430 people participated in the assessment but in order to draw more significant 
conclusions, the population considered for this study is focused on two particular 
generational cohorts : (the Millennial and the Baby Boomer generation). Thus, for this 
study only the data pertaining to these two specific groups is analyzed, the remaining data 
is deleted. The final sample size for this research is 337 (N=337). The sample is chosen to 
represent both groups, consisting of 337 participants of different background (age, 
education, gender, occupation). The targets selected for the assignment are part of the 
same university campus in India. As a matter of fact, the participants are considerably 
representative of this thesis's studied population. Thus, participants varies in elements like: 
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o Generation: Actually, 293 participants of the assessment are millennials (86.9%) 
and the other 44(N=44) or 13.1% of the sample pertain to the Baby Boomer 
generation.  
o Age: The same age categorization of groups that is outlined on chapter 2 is used, 
practically millennials (17-35), and Baby Boomers (50-62). The mean of age for 
the millennial cohort is 27.3 years old and 54.6 years for Baby Boomers. There is a 
highest number of 25 years old participants (n=35) from millennials and a highest 
number of 51 years old participants (n=10) from Baby Boomers. 
o Gender: All the participants of the sample are Indians comprised of 229 male 
(68.0%) and 108 (32.0%) female. There are 95(32.4%) female and 198 (67.6%) 
male from the millennials. On the other hand, there are 31(70.5%) males and 
13(29.5%) females from the BB group. Data coding is used for the sake of this 
experiment data analysis. For instance, regarding participants' gender, male is 
coded 1 and female is coded 2. Data coding is also used to present other elements 
of the dataset as well, such as education and computer self-efficacy (shown below). 
The age and gender distribution of the sample are presented in the tables below. 
o Computer efficacy: 168 users (49.9%) have technical background and 
169(50.1%) have non-technical background. In this thesis technical background is 
translated as computer self-efficacy. Coding is also used here, where being 
technical competent is given a 1, and not competent a 2. 
o Education: Concerning education, codes 1-4 are used representing the level of 
education the users have, Bachelor(1), Masers(2), PhD(3) and Professional(4). Out 
of the studied sample: 151 participants have bachelor degree, 124 masters, 40 PhD 
and 22 professional education. 
 
5.1.3 Demographic distribution 
After excluding the data not pertaining to either of the focused groups ( Millennial and 
Baby Boomer), the answers of 337 responders are kept and analyzed. Details of the 
descriptive characteristics are given in the tables below. 
 
Table 1. Age distribution of subjects 
Age Frequency Proportion 
(17-35) 293 86.9 
(50-65) 44 13.1 
Total 337 100.0 
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Table 2. Gender distribution of sample 
Gender Code Frequency Proportion 
Male 1 229 68.0 
Female 2 108 32.0 
Total  337 100.0 
 
Table 3. Computer efficacy of participants 
Computer efficacy Code Frequency Proportion 
Tech-savvy 1 168 49.9 
Non-tech-savvy 2 169 50.1 
Total  337 100.0 
 
Table 4. Education distribution of participants 
Education Code Frequency Proportion 
Bachelor 1 151 44.8 
Master 2 124 36.8 
PhD 3 40 11.9 
Professional 4 22 6.5 
Total  337 100.0 
 
 
5.2 Analysis of results 
5.2.1 Susceptibility rates 
Lord Kelvin quotes: “To measure is to know”, in the same reasoning this study aims to 
know each generation's degree of vulnerability by measuring their actual performance 
when faced with the phishing attack. Analysis of data collected from the phishing 
assignment generates the effects' of several independent variables (see section 4.3.3) on 
the single dependent variable (phishing susceptibility). Having said that, the received 
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dataset is initially entered into a Microsoft Excel file to statistically analyze it. The figure 
below presents participants' actual victimization on the phishing assessment. 
 
              
                                     Figure 1. Participants victimization rates 
 
In order to indicate falling for the phish, data coding is reused. A value of (2) is given to 
"falling" victim of the experiment and a value of (1), to non-victim. Presented also in the 
table below solely 29 participants or (8.6%), responded to the email and gave up their 
login credentials and 308 (91.4%) of them did not. It is safe to mention that it is surprising 
the number of participants who got phished. Hence, the assessment's results show a 
considerable value of victimization from the overall targeted sample, and the generation 
who mostly fell for the attack is the millennial generation. Moreover, on generational scale 
out of 293 millennial participants', 29 responded to the email, this percentage (8.6%) is 
higher than Baby Boomers, whose number of victimization occurrence is surprisingly 0.  
  
Table 5.  Generations extend of victimization 
Group Total Victim Non-Victim 
Millennial 293 29 264 
Baby Boomer 44 0 44 
Total 337 29 308 
 
As a matter of fact, the calculated percentage of victimization of the whole sample (8.6%) 
is considered acceptable and in normal range for victims who fall for phishing incidents 
(Knight, 2004). This high victimization rates among millennials shows that they are 
comfortable divulging their login credentials via email. This hypothesize a lack of concern 
29
308
victim
non-victim
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from their part in authenticating phishing emails or in SE security in general. However, 
possible factors impacting these results are discussed in the sections below. 
 
5.2.2 Supporting the stated hypothesis 
This thesis' aim to answer the first research question (see Chapter 1), is attained by 
quantitatively measuring the targeted cohorts' actual vulnerability on phishing 
performance. Thus, independent sample t-test is performed in order to analyze the null and 
alternative hypothesis. T-test is used to test whether there is any significant distinction 
between means of two groups (DeCoster and Claypool, 2004). The null hypothesis (see 
H0 and H1 in Chapter 4: That is no statically significant difference among the two studied 
generational cohorts) is actually rejected by the analyzed data which, supports the 
alternative hypothesis. Having set alpha α=.05, results from the unpaired sample t-test 
show a significant contrast of subjects actual performance on the phishing attack ( 
probability p< α). Independent sample t-test arise in a t-Stat (two-tail) value of 5.663 with 
292 degrees of freedom, explaining the existing difference on phishing susceptibility 
among them. To summarize, these results fit also the results of the Chi-squared test (see 
section 5.2.3), rejecting the null hypothesis (the approach of hypothesis disproving is 
attained). Further details on t-test are provided on the table below. 
 
Table 6. Unpaired samples t-Test results 
t-Stat(two-tail) t Crit(two-tail) Prob p(2-tail) α=.05 Df 
5.663 1.968 p=0.000000035 0.05 292 
    
5.2.3 Groups and falling for phish 
Another way to answer the first research question is by executing the Chi-Squared test to 
assess any difference among the two studied-generations leading to acceptance or rejection 
of the null hypothesis (Zibran, 2007). Chi-Squared test is used to measure the probability 
of association of independent groups (Maxwell, 1971). Results show a significant 
distinction on susceptibility among millennials and baby boomers, with millennials being 
more vulnerable (p=0.02). Thus, there is enough evidence (t-test and chi-squared test) to 
conclude an undeniable contrast among these two studied generational cohorts on 
performance on phishing assessment. Slightly differing on age categorization, other 
researchers (Sheng et al., 2010; Kumaraguru et al., 2009) have also found younger users of 
age 18-25 to be more vulnerable to these types of threats.  
On the other hand, both males and females are considered equally vulnerable to SE 
attacks, with not enough evidence proving the opposite (p=0.4). Moreover, no difference 
was also shown among technical efficient group and the non-technical efficient one 
(p=0.3), having set the target (p<0.05). Also, groups alternated in educational level, 
demonstrated non-statistically significant difference on susceptibility from the Chi-
squared test results (p=0.08).  
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5.2.4 Estimating variables impact on susceptibility 
In order to find out the main reasons users fall for Social Engineering attacks, the impact 
of several variables on susceptibility is analyzed. Thus, having susceptibility to phishing 
attack the only dependent variable of the study, linear regression is performed to test the 
impact of a number of potential predictors on this variable. Linear regression is used to 
measure the strength of each of the predictors on the one variable of interest 
(susceptibility) (Montgomery et al., 2012). Hence, regression coefficient is calculated to 
show the type of relationship among variables. For this study, the significance of a relation 
is obtained in a probability value lower than (p< 0.05) (DeCoster, 2006). Any p-value 
(indicating the strength of relationships) greater that this significance level demonstrates 
lack of evidence to prove variables' notable influence on vulnerability to SE threats.  
Therefore, linear regression is applied many times independently among pairs of the 
dependent variable with the independent ones and results are shown below.  
 
Table 7. Linear regression output 
Susceptibility predictors (p-value) 
Regression 
coefficient(Beta) 
Age p=0.29 β=-0.002 
Gender p=0.47 β =0.023 
Generation p=0.02 β =-0.098 
Education p=0.86 β =0.002 
Technology efficacy p=0.34 β =0.029 
 
As shown also from the table above, the analysis of variance (ANOVA) is performed on 
finding out the strength of the relationship among pairs. 
Age 
Participants’ age is found to not predict their susceptibility to Social Engineering attacks 
F(1-335)=1.103, p=0.29, with a negative insignificant relationship between these two 
variables (β=-0.002). These results are consistent with results of other studies 
(Kumaraguru et al., 2007; Dhamija et al., 2006). However, there exist also studies that 
claim that age do have an important impact on users' performance on phishing attacks 
(Sheng et al., 2010; Kumaraguru et al., 2009).  
Education 
A positive non-significant correlation is also found between users' education and their fall 
for the attack F(1-335)=0.0278, p=0.86. In support to results of this study, (Dhamija et al., 
2006; Sheng et al., 2007) concluded that educational level does not play any significant 
role on users' vulnerability. 
Gender 
Linear regression results do not show any significant impact of gender on users' shown 
degree of vulnerability, F(1-335)=0.502, p=0.47 with the Chi-Squared test also showing 
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no difference among males and females in the rates they fell for the phishing assessment. 
In support to these findings, Kumaraguru et al, also found no distinction in phishing 
performance among 2 genders (2007). Other researchers however, have found females to 
be more vulnerable to such attacks (Jagatic et al., 2007; Sheng et al., 2010; Alseadoon 
2014).  
Technology-efficacy 
Furthermore, technology efficacy is spotted unimportant in predicting susceptibility F(1-
337)=0.908, p=0.34, supporting the findings of the other researchers (Vishwanath et al., 
2011). However  Dhamija et al., found lack of knowledge regarding technology in general 
to be one of the main reasons why people get phished (Dhamija et al., 2006). Sheng et al, 
found that for each unit of users' increase in knowledge concerning technology, they fall 
for 3.6% fewer phish, categorizing self-rated knowledge regarding technology a relevant 
asset in reducing users' likelihood of becoming potential victims of any type of SE attack( 
2010). 
Generation  
As it is assumed, generation is observed to explicitly predict users' susceptibility to SE, 
resulting in having the highest impact of all factors F(1-335)=4.805, p=.029. This means 
that when this item increases, the likelihood of users responding to phishing emails 
decreases (β=-0.098). This variable is proposed and studied by this thesis for the first time 
and statistical results highlight that it should be a new essential field of study for other 
researchers as well. Additionally, these results demonstrate higher chances for intruders to 
exploit millennials comfort zone in regards to Social Engineering. 
This analysis is focused understanding 5 correlations in total and surprisingly only one of 
them is classified as noteworthy and the remaining 4 are considered statistically 
unacceptable. Generational element is found to be significant at p<.05, being the only 
supported factor to have a worthy of attention correlation with vulnerability.  
 
5.2.5 Multiple regression and Multicollinearity 
Multi-collinearity tests if there exists any relationship among independent variables that 
could influence the regression analysis outcomes and hinder the overall output 
interpretation. Hence it is notable to be performed in this study to deepen the 
understanding of the findings. The multi-collinearity test is done when there are more than 
one potential predictors on the model that could have a significant relationship among 
each-other (Hair et al., 1998) and interfere the results. This study assumes that the 
relationship between age and generation makes it difficult to distinguish each of these 
variables' effect. Thus, variable inflation factors (VIF) (used to calculate the inflection of 
the independent variables' variances (Lin, 2008)) are measured and results interpretation is 
given below. 
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Table 8. Multicollinearity test results 
Independent variables VIF value 
Age 9.296 
Gender 1.019 
Technology 1.060 
Education 1.385 
Generation 8.336 
    
In order to understand the variable inflation factor values presented in the table below, the 
threshold 10 (VIF > 10) is set to indicate the presence of collinearity among independent 
variables (Belsley et al., 2005). Comparing the computed VIF values, it is assumed to exist 
a correlation among age and generation explanatory variables. Though, assumptions 
cannot be concluded since the VIF values are below the threshold and further investigation 
controlling for age effect is necessary. Therefore, recalculating the VIF values omitting the 
variable showing the highest VIF factor (the age factor) changes the results of the analysis 
and collinearity is avoided. Nevertheless, this approach is claimed to obscure the statistical 
model and getting a large enough sample size to cover geographic representation of the 
targets is suggested as the most proper solution to circumvent collinearity occurrence 
within the model. 
 
Table 9. Multicollinearity test 
Remained factors VIF values 
Gender 1.003255 
Technology 1.058756 
Education 1.100619 
Generation 1.158866 
 
The justification of using multiple regression apart from linear regression, is not only to 
investigate multicollinearity presence in the model, but also because linear regression 
could only measure a single predicting variable with the predicted one, being unable to test 
many-to-one relationships. Moreover, this is done in order to at the end solely the 
variables resulting in significant relationships are kept and exclude the others from the 
final model. Multiple regression is suitable for analyzing multiple independent variables 
impact on a single dependent variable. Thus, multiple regression is performed and results 
are shown in the table below. 
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Table 10. Multiple Regression output 
Predictors Std err p-value β coefficient Statist signific 
Age 0.004 0.008 0.012 Yes 
Gender 0.032 0.294 0.034 No 
Education 0.020 0.676 -0.008 No 
Tech-efficacy 0.031 0.734 0.010 No 
Generation 0.129 0.001 -0.422 Yes 
Significant at  **p<.005 
     
Again, in the same line with linear regression, results from multiple regression show 
generation factor to have the strongest impact on susceptibility (p-value <.005). Consisting 
in a negative relationship (β=-0.422), as generation variable increases, vulnerability level 
of users actually decreases. The coefficients (Beta values) for the rest of the independent 
variables are listed in the table above. 
An explanation of  the younger generation's shown vulnerability can be attributed to their 
lack of awareness on SE risks. Therefore, the Millennials' high tendency to respond to 
Social Engineering attacks is described and related to their personality traits, 
distinguishing them from previous generations. 
 
5.4 Summary 
This chapter has analyzed collected-dataset from phishing assessment and findings are 
presented. It has explained how outcomes of the analysis enabled answers to the research 
questions. The results from the phishing experiment have showed that young people of 
today fell victim of the assessment at higher rates than their parents and as such, are 
assumed to be more susceptible to Social Engineering threats. This section has also 
outlined factors influencing users' response to these attacks.  
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6 Understanding gens shown susceptibility 
This chapter explains generations found vulnerability to SE, reasons that interpret their 
shown high degree of susceptibility and the psychology behind it. Having said that, this 
section aims to answer the third research question of this study and at the same time to 
psychologically explain the quantitative findings from the phishing assignment dataset 
analysis. In light to this aim, certain personality traits are highlighted as having major 
contribution to generations' likelihood of victimization. At the end of the chapter, a 
defense strategy to combat Social Engineering threats is proposed. 
 
6.1 Potential victims psychological profile 
In order to explain cohort groups shown susceptibility to phishing experiment this study 
seeks to understand how are personality traits and generational differences in regards to 
phishing related. Generational groups unique personality characteristics are a reflection of 
different political and social changes lived by each cohort group thus, generations are 
proven to differ in personality traits (Barrick et al., 2001; Macky et al., 2008). As such, 
shaped by certain personality traits sensitive to these attacks, different cohorts perceive 
security risks differently (Ng et al., 2012). Peoples' personality is nothing more than their 
likelihood to behave in certain ways, and its traits (Big Five traits) are shown to have a 
determinant impact on users feasibility to responding to Social Engineering attacks 
(Uebelacker and Quiel, 2014; Halevi et al., 2013) . 
The Chi-squared test and regression analysis show a significant correlation between 
millennials and falling for the phish (See 5.2.3). Hence, it is worth finding out what 
personality qualities make this cohort more susceptible to phishing, compared to their 
Baby Boomer parents. 
Many researchers target conscientiousness, the most relevant personality trait to 
determine phishing susceptibility (Halevi et al., 2015), due to its link to continuance 
commitment (Erdheim et al., 2006; Workman, 2008). Therefore, a significant difference is 
found between generations on conscientiousness trait with young people of today 
(millennials) found to be more conscientious than the other generations on the workforce 
(Generation X and Baby Boomers) (Roberts et al., 2006), clarifying millennials bad 
performance on the conducted assessment. On the other side, both effective and normative 
commitment are suggested to relate to extraversion as such, (Erdheim et al., 2006), 
increasing the likelihood of millennials falling for SE attacks (Workman, 2008; Parrish et 
al., 2009; Alseadoon et al., 2012). Correspondingly, an increase of extraversion, 
conscientiousness and emotional stability is found to characterize younger generations 
(age 20 to 40), all being personality elements explicitly increasing susceptibility to 
security risks and to SE attacks (Roberts et al., 2006). Thus, many other researchers 
(Andre et al., 2010; Gentile et al., 2010; Scollon and Diener, 2006; Smits et al., 2011) 
emphasized the fact that younger cohort groups are more vulnerable to phishing as they 
score higher on extraversion compared to older generations.  
Showing a generational increase on self-esteem, over-confidence and entitlement, many 
studies found Generation Y to possess higher levels of narcissistic personality traits 
(Steward and Bernhardt, 2010; Twenge et al., 2008; Twenge and Foster, 2010; Bourke and 
Mechler, 2010) than older generations, who show lower narcissism scores (Foster et al., 
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2003). Narcissism in particular is found to have a strong relationship with extraversion, 
explaining this paper's found generational difference in vulnerability to phishing attack.  
Moreover, one other domain of Big Five personality traits that happen to increase peoples' 
susceptibility to SE is high agreeableness rates (Parrish et al., 2009; Modic and Lea, 
2012). Darwish et al., claim an increased level of agreeableness among younger people 
and woman (2012), potentially explaining results of the statistical analysis in this work 
(specifically, millennials shown high victimization rates on the assignment). In the same 
consistency other studies found young users to be more vulnerable to phishing attacks as 
possessing higher levels of agreeableness, which is strongly correlated to the likelihood of 
falling victims of security attacks (Srivastava et al., 2003). 
 
6.2 Awareness and training against SE 
This section reveals insight towards designing the most effective strategy to reduce young 
people of today susceptibility to Social Engineering threats. It specifies objectives to 
achieve, needs and weaknesses to comply with, policies and procedures that have to be 
met. It covers all the phases of a continual awareness training from design, development 
and implementation to explore at the end the best evaluation practices to measure its 
effectiveness. It describes the combination of the current solutions on place to establish the 
best program to include in every high-school curricula.   
 
6.2.1 The best defense against Social Engineering 
It is already clear that there are no great solutions decreasing end-users vulnerability to 
Social Engineering, regardless of existing numerous proposals having different 
effectiveness rates. In this case it is worthless to propose any new equally effective 
solution. Moreover, there is "no need to reinvent the wheel if there are vehicles already in 
place (Desman, 2001, pg. xv)." How about exploiting all these taken efforts by combining 
them, taking the best of each to comply with specific requirements and specific target 
group? This leads to the idea of expansion of the already proposed solutions via 
necessities recognition and meeting objectives.  
Special awareness campaigns, training sessions or education are examples of several 
applied methods that have been the most effective ones in mitigating vulnerability to 
Social Engineering attacks. Trying to find out the best possible solution that works 
reducing likelihood to fall for SE attacks, recall the educational security conferences and 
their approach. Excellent events with detailed covering of most important security issues, 
a lot of text material which is tough to understand and many security threats to became 
aware of. Then every participant walks through the conference door accompanied by the 
positive feedback and the brain filled with important theory needed to be remembered. 
Taken by the everyday's routine, the great lessons picked up at the conference hall are 
already gone. The core theoretical security concepts are forgotten, none is bothered 
changing passwords, doubting a friendly behavior or even paying attention to malicious or 
unapproved content spread on SNS. At this point everybody realizes that this is not the 
best approach to follow. Education is the highest level of any learning phases which starts 
with awareness, than training. Thus, it is worth implementing it only when the first two 
phases are fully and effectively covered.  
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Millennials are critically not aware of Social Engineering threats because no one has put 
sufficient efforts to show them, so every program of this profile should start addressing 
awareness at the very grounds. It is crucial to achieve building SE awareness among the 
current generation (you cannot make them change attitude unless they want to). However, 
awareness is simple attention to security thus it is not enough, a more interactive approach 
should also be included in any effort reducing susceptibility towards SE. Both awareness 
and training as fundamental learning phases should be tightly incorporated  in any Social 
Engineering defense framework.  
In a research conducted to understand Estonians attitude and willingness on the 
implementation of security awareness and trainings in elementary, secondary and higher 
education it is emphasized by the researchers that nothing is done at the lower stages of 
education yet (Lorenz and Kikkas, 2012). Also the results of some interviews conducted 
with some fellow students of Cyber Security program at TUT, emphasized that education 
of new generations should start from schools as part of their curricula as soon as possible. 
They argue that parents do not have neither time nor resources to do it. A very well-crafted 
security program part of every school can do better in training students to grow up 
knowledgeable users ready to enter the workforce and able to influence their parents. 
Due to all the above covered reasons and millennials' specific security needs, this 
thesis proposes an effective awareness and training program as the best solution to 
mitigate vulnerability to Social Engineering, with awareness intended to create SE 
security consciousness and training to build security skills and behavior.  
The thesis also stresses out the necessity of such program to be integrated in every national 
high-school curricula and to be implemented periodically. It proposes a very productive 
way to develop training programs or campaigns to raise awareness to Social Engineering 
threats and to meet each school's goals. The only known defense for SE attacks is an 
effective security awareness program (Gardner and Thomas, 2014). A template of a SE 
security awareness training is provided on Appendix A of this thesis. 
 
6.3 Program model and assets 
Objectives: 
It is essential to recognize the need for such security frameworks to be incorporated to any 
school program since there is not a single high school (to this thesis best of knowledge) 
that offers a Social Engineering security program. In light to this objective it is crucial to 
clear out that there is not either any previous work that have emphasized the necessity for 
a SE security program nor have composed a training framework for schools to implement. 
However the main objective of this program is to build security consciousness among 
students, arriving at the point they posses secure behavior without having to think before 
applying it. The program will continually remind and teach them the importance of 
protecting themselves against SE threats. To do so, the program aims to ensure that all 
students understand the need to include a SE security awareness program in the school 
curricula via letting them know that everyone is vulnerable to SE attacks. Moreover, it 
should ensure that they understand and acknowledge their security responsibilities. The 
program should clearly specify security policies, ensure that the training have a strong 
awareness approach. So, users must be appropriately focused to meet the program goals, 
be fully motivated to change the behavior that makes them vulnerable to Social 
Engineering risks. Thus, the ultimate scope of the awareness training is making the 
weakest asset of the security chain (users), the strongest link via teaching them to play 
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an essential role in ensuring Social Engineering security via protecting themselves and 
sharing awareness also to their Baby Boomers parents. 
Program profile 
The program should be build focusing mainly on two things: meeting students security 
needs and schools policies and requirements. The model proposed here passes through 
program design, development, its implementation and evaluation. Such strategy 
combining practical learning and interaction is fundamental for this on-going training 
program, being able to build security skills and behavior. In their work Lorenz and Kikkas 
found out that 71% of Estonians prefer hands-on security trainings instead of theoretical 
ones (2012). People learn differently based on their generational and educational 
background, and current generation learns much different than those entering in the 
workforce 30 years ago (Gardner and Thomas, 2014).  There is a big difference between 
providing material of how to defend against SE to this generation and teaching them 
practical skills of a security behavior. Passive learning seems not to work among 
millennials, they would prefer interactive learning instead. Current generation students 
needs social learning, workshops to make them realize how easy it is to fall for these 
attacks. Also this thesis proposes classroom training via active learning, as the most 
efficient type of learning in reaching goals (Gardner and Thomas, 2014). Active learning 
in this training context is explained here (Prince, 2004). This thesis proposes a awareness 
and training model to incorporate seminars, conferences, workshops, short security 
meetings, roundtables, Q&A sessions and other alike facilities in the material delivery. 
Program material 
The selection of material is another essential element to decide about while crafting the 
proper awareness training. Therefore, the training material should be carefully selected 
considering the behavior that school want to convey to students and skills to show when 
faced with actual Social Engineering threats. Achieving to share awareness to students, 
ways to deliver the awareness material are enormous: school monthly newsletter, poster 
campaigns, pens campaigns, monthly security days, security note of the day or other 
innovative ideas created by the security team while designing the program or when 
updating it. Another innovative and appealing idea is rewarding students for compliance 
with school's security policies or continual SE security promotions or acknowledgements 
via coffee mugs, bookmarks, mouse pad, paper weight. In order to make millennials pay 
attention to the program and to awareness particularly, the message in the awareness 
material should also be short and concise, integrate catchy security slogans. Therefore 
both awareness and training material should be simple, easy to use and easy-to-access. 
Because it is an on-going process it is crucial not to stick to only one technique, instead 
mix different delivery techniques up and look to adequate repositories to get the most 
appropriate material. In reach of this, it should not be a take-on-somewhere framework or 
any traditional one, it should be composed based on school's culture. The ways to deliver 
the training should also be new and creative enough to make them participate and learn 
security skills. A list of topics to be covered by the program is provided in Appendix B of 
this thesis. 
Social Psychology 
The crafted program should take into detailed consideration the millennial students 
psychology, as directly involved in the process of changing attitude and behavior via 
changing behavioral intentions. Manjak argues, “Employees will not be motivated to 
change behaviors if they see no reason to change (2006, p. 12)." This thesis highlights 
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the importance to carefully include motivational drivers while designing and 
implementing the program. The security team responsible to design the awareness 
training should include an expert of the field of psychology in planning and composing the 
program. Security rewarding or appraisals for proper security behavior by students are 
innovative ideas that should not miss in the maintenance of the program. Moreover, the 
training should be designed to comply with generation Y personality traits vulnerable to 
Social Engineering attacks. By specifying particular security behaviors intended to convey 
among school students, social learning in compliance with social psychology is proved to 
work best for them. However, security is said to be a process (Schneier, 2000) and it 
should take a lot of continual efforts in achieving to build security consciousness among 
"nexters". Thus, this is crucial for young people of this generation and employees of 
tomorrow, to be packed with the needed security behavior (before entering the workforce) 
required in every organization struggling to create such a culture. 
The program security team 
In order to build the most appropriate awareness and training strategy for any school to 
execute, the establishment of a security team is crucial. Behaving as the central authority 
of this long process, its primary duty is to develop security policies and set standards. The 
team will have to deal with the general management of the awareness and training 
program being the main responsible party of the training overall efficacy. Thus, it should 
ensure the training productivity via keeping track of its success and compliance. 
Therefore, the security team will specify methods to be used in evaluating the program 
effectiveness: conduct questionnaires, focus groups, interviews, periodic assessment on 
students' security awareness etc. These tools are also a way to measure the program's 
accessibility and material understanding by students, via monitoring their attendance and 
performance. At the end the team should carry on needed updates on the program based on 
the conducted periodic reviews.  
 
6.4 Summary 
This chapter has pursued to explain the current generation observed susceptibility to 
Social Engineering and has revealed different methods aimed to lessen their vulnerability. 
The results found on chapter 5 are validated in this section via tuning the adequate SE 
defense for schools to integrate in their curricula. The next session gives suggestions and 
directions for future work to be done through assessing the thesis limitations.  
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7 Discussions 
This chapter focuses on concluding this thesis findings and summarize its core 
contribution. Reviewing results and implications, it identifies new challenges to extend the 
mitigation of SE vulnerability in the future and explore the unaddressed aspects of this 
problem. On the whole, it is still requisite to study deeper the generational factor of SE 
attack and evaluate any thoughts or findings in regards. On that reason, this research 
concludes with recommendations.  
 
7.1 Drawing final conclusions 
Overall, this thesis proposed to study endusers' vulnerability to Social Engineering in 
terms of generational cohorts. The statistical analysis showed susceptibility to be 
significantly affected by generational factor and paradoxically, technology-efficiency was 
not found to be able to ameliorate users SE threats detection abilities. In the same lines 
with the current research findings, it was reasonable to conclude that none of the analyzed 
demographic factors plays any relevant role determining users vulnerability. Moreover, 
educational level produced insignificant results to expect a furthered education to give 
better chances of detecting SE threats. 
The obtained results enabled this thesis to meet its main objective, highlighting the 
importance to differentiate victims of Social Engineering frauds on generation-base in 
future studies. Via analysis of targets' performance on phishing assessment, this research 
found the current generation of today showing higher likelihood to be deceived by SE 
attacks. Having the starting date the same as Internet Domain Name System, it was 
surprising to find out the most internet-savvy generation to be more vulnerable to SE 
attacks compared to Baby Boomer generation. This implies that just because one is 
knowledgeable to SE threats, does not become more aware or less vulnerable and vice 
versa. 
In chapter five and six, the author explained reasons contributing to gens' shown 
susceptibility and claimed to link SE vulnerability to their personality characteristics. 
Generally speaking, consciousness, agreeableness and extraversion traits were found to 
show the highest impact on generation Ys' tendency to fall for Social Engineering threats. 
These particular personality elements are also suggested by previous works to correlate to 
increased susceptibility to phishing and to enlarge current generation potential to SE 
victimization. Answering the second research question these personality characteristics 
can be exploited by intruders to make millennials phish out sensitive information. 
Implying the necessity for a defense strategy for any high school to implement, finally this 
study evaluated the effectiveness of the numerous SE mitigation methods proposed, to 
come out with a solution meeting the observations driven from the overall research. Rather 
than changing current generation personality characteristics (proved to correlate to 
increased vulnerability) the mitigation strategy propose to employ these specific 
characteristics to build secure behavior and attitude towards SE among high-school 
students. The third research question was answered crafting the SE security program 
complying with the millennial generation SE security needs and expectations. The impact 
of the awareness and training program proposed in chapter 6 is promising since it is 
planned covering relevant findings of this research. 
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7.2 Practical limitations 
Target groups' tested vulnerability is translated to SE security weaknesses they 
demonstrate when faced with SE attacks and that should be addressed by every 
methodology seeking to reduce users susceptibility. Generally speaking, changing 
weaknesses into adequate SE security skills will definitely confine Millennials from fall 
for SE attacks at higher rates via lessen their deficiency in SE security awareness. 
The first limitation of this research is being a cross-sectional study (see Twenge and 
Campbell, 2008) as such, it does not expect to have fully assessed and support the stated 
hypothesis or to have completely answered the research questions. Moreover, the 
approached hypothesis is just an assumption (since this work is the first to anticipate a 
substantive difference among the studied generational cohorts) and specific conclusions of 
the root causes of the detected difference in vulnerability cannot be easily elicited. 
The second limitation constitutes in that although both generations were core targets of the 
study, there was a disproportional generational distribution of participants on the 
assessment (low number of Baby Boomer participants) which could lead to question the 
significance of the results. 
Another core limitation of this research stays on the fact that the targeted endusers shared 
the same cultural background and more specifically, the same university campus, lacking 
to validate the revealed outcomes through covering a wider geographic area. Therefore, 
the same findings do not expend to other cultures and countries (due to deficiency of 
research on the same topic), which may result in different generations profiling on Social 
Engineering susceptibility. 
In addition, generational groups in this research were created assigning individuals to a 
generation according their birth years however, what if the observed vulnerability 
dissimilarities be confounded by age and to have altered this research's results? For future 
works, a fleshed-out methodology should be employed, isolating the effect of generation 
or keeping the age variable constant to derive more specific outcomes. 
Furthermore, in order to reveal meaningful conclusions and understand stereotypes 
occurring across these two generations it is trivial to access a large enough number of 
victims (confined by many reasons). 
These several elements could have resulted in better conclusions if could have been 
included in this research, thus a longitudinal research should be undertaken to cover 
these limitations via taking this thesis as a benchmark to draw better outcomes. 
 
7.3 Recommendations for future work 
Along the findings, the author in this study has also outlined hints to evolve researching to 
defend against SE and at the same time to avoid digging into wrong directions. Currently, 
there is a fair gap in related works studying generational differences in personality 
influencing their susceptibility to SE, since the few studies that exist are mostly focused on 
generational differences in general (Twenge, 2000) and not on susceptibility to SE 
specifically hence, this thesis is a crucial foundation on seeking empirical evidence to this 
approach. Moreover, there is no other research on studying endusers vulnerability to SE on 
generation-base, this work propose a means of categorizing victims of SE on generational 
cohorts sharing similar personality characteristics directly correlated to increase SE 
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vulnerability. For instance, replication of this study could be recommended to continue 
analyzing the effect of variables which are studied here for the first time.  
Hence, this research highlights the importance to continue research: 
➢ personality differences among generations in relation to susceptibility to SE (since 
it is already proven that generations distinctions in personality traits impact their 
likelihood to respond to these attacks). 
➢ deeper grounds towards supporting the stated hypothesis, for instance it is 
worthwhile seek to complement other researches on how to profile SE victims.   
➢ how to determine what is the right balance to propose strategies to mitigate 
endusers tendency to get social engineered (why not improving the existing ones 
complying with your needs instead). 
➢ the same topic with data in which age factor can be controlled (noting the 
interdependence that age-generation elements have on each-other). 
Bounded by time constraint, this study missed to evaluate the proposed SE security 
awareness and training program efficiency thus, it is trivial to evaluate this thesis proposed 
model effectiveness in reducing vulnerability and furthermore, use this as a benchmark for 
other proposed training programs. Nevertheless, this work is a promising start to the idea 
of studying victims to SE attacks categorized on generational cohorts and future 
approaches should continue exploring how victims of SE attacks differ via enhancing this 
study's rule of thumb guidelines and listed challenges.   
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Appendix 
I. The Social Engineering security awareness and training framework 
layout for any high school to corporate in its curricula 
 
❖ National School Security Policy and procedures 
o SE security scope 
o Objectives 
o Duties and limitations 
 
❖ Program design 
This phase of the program reveals the first impact to its approach since it outlines 
the particular objectives the program aims to meet. Such, the overall strategy 
should be developed complying with the school requirements and students security 
needs. It ought to clearly identify school's security policies and standards, the 
communication channels used and needs for such a program to include in the 
school curricula. In other words it should list out crucial elements of the program 
before implementing it. Having said that, the program of this nature should be 
planned on detail, after a long period of time collecting ideas, pointing out 
expectations and identifying intended goals.  
Via incorporating any existing technique proven to reduce individuals 
susceptibility, the program should be designed making students understand the 
necessity to include a SE security training program in their school curricula, along 
with making them recognize school's IT security policies and their security 
responsibilities. 
 
❖ Program management 
In order to achieve the aspired goals it is crucial to put particular emphasis on the 
program management, hence this thesis proposes to settle it on a central authority. 
Every school should establish a security awareness team to carry out the whole 
on-going program and as such, the program effectiveness responsibility to be 
mainly concentrated on this asset. Therefore, the team should work on each 
program's element and instill compliances towards obtaining its objectives. It 
should manage the bullet points of the strategy: policy enforcement (schools 
security policy should be practical enough to ensure students acceptance and 
compliance), successful promotion of the security program and make decisions on 
how often the program will be implemented (note that it is very taught to achieve 
security consciousness by running the program once, twice or three times a year). 
Being part of the school curricula, the program should be persistent, a continual 
event to implement.  
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❖ Program development 
Development of the training content via establishing its core scope and the 
designed strategy is carried out. The selection of the training resources should be 
addressed keeping in mind students needs and their approach to learning (in 
achieving to bolster their SE security skills). Being a fundamental asset of any 
learning theory, awareness material of the program should be chosen to be both 
low cost and efficient in delivering the Social Engineering security message. The 
campaigns content should be simple, short and straight to the point. Towards 
retaining students competence to Social Engineering defense, the security policy 
development is trivial for this program. Hence, sufficient documents listing goals, 
limitations and expectations of school should be created. The overall program must 
be set complying the school's vast array of requirements via outlining students 
security duties and limitations.  
 
❖ Program implementation 
Once have gone through all the above phases of the training strategy and being 
equipped with clear-cut goals, implementing the program is the final step in 
achieving to render the adequate SE fortification. Additionally, beneficial 
communication channels and training material delivery mediums should be on 
place while implementing the training (prefer class-based instead of web-based or 
distance-learning). In the broadest view, such robust training can undoubtedly 
achieve hardening the millennial students falling for Social Engineering. 
Delivering the training periodically, continual implementation of lessons learned 
and feedback, is the best way to reach program's testing and evaluation.  
 
❖ Program evaluation 
Even-though this is a post-implementation step, constructive testing is core to 
maintain in a on-going security awareness program. It directly addresses the 
training efficiency via monitoring and evaluation of the program. By selecting 
effective evaluation methods to carry on (conducted questionnaires, focus groups, 
interviews, periodic assessment of school's security awareness), it provides 
opportunities to improve students training for the next implementation. 
Furthermore, feedback is crucial in any on-going process, as it provides chances to 
patch management or perform program updates to reach better results on upcoming 
sessions. Beyond measuring the program's accessibility via periodic reviews worth 
performing, it safeguards targets from serious endangerment of falling prey of SE 
attacks. The inclusion of motivational drivers on the very roots of the program 
leads to the most efficient arsenal towards fighting Social Engineering.    
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II. List of topics to be included in any high-school SE security 
awareness and training program 
 
Here are listed some core awareness and training topics to be covered by the program. 
Note that the list should be modified and updated after each program reimplementation.  
 
 The program's focus ... 
 What is Social Engineering ? 
 Are we even affected ? 
 Why do we need to be aware of SE threats ? 
 The weakest link of the security chain ...  
 Are we vulnerable towards these attacks ? 
 What are the SE weaknesses making us vulnerable ? 
 Reasons choosing a specific audience (target group) for the training. 
 What are our security responsibilities towards SE ? 
 Understanding the necessity of Social Engineering security. 
 Explaining the necessity of a SE security awareness and training to corporate in the 
school curricula. 
 Deploying motivation and interest in the program. 
 Identify the intended social engineering security awareness attitude to achieve. 
 Identify the intended social engineering security training skills to achieve. 
 Study real-case scenarios of popular Social Engineering attacks. 
 Identify the importance of Question&Answer sessions of the training. 
 List the most common SE attack forms and analyze techniques deployed by 
attackers. 
 Policy understanding and compliance. 
 PASSWORD security. 
 Phishing, the criminals most favorite SE attack. 
 Social Engineering on Social Networking sites, what to be careful about ? 
 Define effective communication channels for the program. 
 The importance to conduct evaluations for the program. 
 Adjust the program implementing the lessons learned, students feedback and  
reviews. 
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 Review objectives: what were goals the program planned to reach (the objectives 
specifically are to ensure social engineering security awareness and build security 
skills in regards) and were they reached ? 
 The frequency of program implementation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
57 
 
III. Students questionnaire to assess their general knowledge and 
viewpoint on the issue 
 
NOTE: This can be carried out before designing the program in order to address the core 
points (identify students knowledge, attitude, and perspective in regards to social 
engineering) to include in the training.   
 
1. What is Social Engineering? 
 
2. What human weaknesses social engineering attacks mostly exploit? 
  
3. Which social engineering attack types you think you are more vulnerable to? 
 
4. List the first protection measures you personally would take to protect against social 
engineering? 
 
5. What do you think are your security needs and obligations? 
 
6. What personality aspects you find more vulnerable to social engineering attacks? 
o commitment    
o social proof 
o Big 5 personality traits 
o reciprocity 
o liking 
o any other you could specify 
 
7. Do you consider yourself vulnerable to social engineering threats ? 
 
8. What do you think is the weakest link in the security chain ? 
 
9. What do you think are the adequate countermeasures to social engineering ? 
10. Are you aware of your school security policies ? 
 a) yes                b)no              c)somehow            d)our school do not have any 
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IV. Evaluating the training effectiveness questionnaire 
 
(same approach can be followed using other evaluation methods such as: surveys, 
interviews, etc, for every post-implementation of the training) 
 
1. From 1-10 score the relevance of the implemented security awareness and training 
program at your school? 
 
2. What were your expectations of your school social engineering security awareness and 
training program? 
 
3. List any motivational driver that made you focus more attention to the training? 
 
4. How applicable are your school policies and standards, and which of the following do 
you find the least applicable? 
           a) physical security policies                b) computer security policies(password 
policies) 
           c) person verification policies                      d) guest acceptance policies 
 
5. Which would be the best way (communication channel) to deliver the school awareness 
and training material: 
 
✓ The school monthly security newspaper 
✓ Posters campaigns 
✓ Monthly security days 
✓ Security tip of the day 
✓ Catchy slogans on the school webpage 
✓ SE security workshops 
✓ Other (your proposal) 
 
6. What are the main elements you find relevant to build social engineering security 
habits? 
 
7. How do you rate the complexity of the training material delivery and understanding?  
      very easy             complex      very complex           do not know           
 
8. How do you assess your SE knowledge/awareness/security skills after the deployment 
of the school training (comparing these before integrating the program in the curricula and 
now) ? 
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Limited  
Considerable 
High  
Expert 
 
9. Were the program objectives and your expectations met? 
 
10. What do you think should be improved in the next coming program implementation? 
 
11. Please list any additional comments/ remarks for the program as a whole or for any 
element of it ? 
 
12. Overall, I think my SE security awareness and behavioral capabilities have improved 
due to the training. (please, give also your comment) 
▪ Agree 
▪ Disagree 
▪ Neutral 
▪ Do not know 
▪ Not at all 
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